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New Taliban Video of US/AU Hostages, Teachers King & Weekes; Asks Trump & Turnbull to Negotiate Release

In Afghanistan, Archive, Australia, Taliban, Terrorism, USA on July 5, 2017 at 6:49 AM


The Afghan Taliban on Wednesday released a new hostage video of two professors they kidnapped from the American University in Kabul in August 2016.

Kevin King, a 60-year-old American, and Timothy John Weeks, an Australian 48-year-old, are shown against a brown background talking to camera.

In the video, King tells Trump: “Have mercy on me and get me out.” In a later comment he says “please do not send any commandos.”

Weeks then tells Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull to “speak to the Taliban, negotiate with the Taliban. I know you are able to do this.”

Five gunmen dressed as Afghan military abducted the men last year from an SUV on a main road near the campus of their university in the Afghan capital.

The Taliban released the last video of the pair in January on YouTube, in which both pleaded with President Donald Trump to negotiate with the militants for their release.

In both videos, the location of their filming is unclear and so too are the precise dates that they were filmed. In the 13-minute January video, the pair again pleaded with Trump. “If we stay here for much longer, we will be killed. I don’t want to die here,” Weeks said. The Taliban requested that the U.S. release “prisoners” in return for the professors.

The risk of kidnap in the Afghan capital remains high for foreign nationals, particularly westerners, and many remain confined to Embassy buildings or secured residential compounds. In November, an Australian woman was kidnapped but her location is unknown.

In August 2016, another Australian woman, Kerry Jane Wilson, was released after being held for four months following her kidnap in Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan. The perpetrators of the kidnaps are unknown in both cases.

The Taliban is also holding American-Canadian couple Joshua Boyle and Caitlan Coleman, kidnapping them in 2012 as they traveled in northern Afghanistan. The pair have two children born in captivity.

Unlike the Islamic State militant group (ISIS), which has posted gruesome execution videos of its hostages, the Taliban has appeared to be willing to accept ransom payments or prisoner swaps for the release of its captives.

The U.S. has engaged in prisoner swaps with the Taliban. In 2014, the Taliban-aligned Haqqani group released U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl, who famously told his story in the podcast Serial, in return for five Taliban prisoners.


Afghanistan’s Kandahar Airfield an Alleged Heroin Hotbed

In Afghanistan, Archive, Military, USA on June 17, 2015 at 4:54 AM
Screen Shot 2015-06-17 at 7.23.58 PM
Toor Jan was clearly nervous when he arrived at the guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan. “If my boss found out I did this, he will shoot me,” the young heroin dealer told the Georgia Straight in an interview.

Toor Jan (not his real name) described last March how he sold large amounts of heroin to Afghan translators working at two NATO bases in Kandahar who, in turn, resold the heroin to NATO soldiers.

Toor Jan said he and his partner were selling from 270 grams to one kilogram of heroin weekly to the translators working at Kandahar Airfield—until recently headquarters of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan—and at Kandahar City’s Camp Nathan Smith, former home of the Canadian provincial reconstruction team.

It’s enough to get 2,700 to 10,000 users high. The street value in Vancouver would be $54,000 to $200,000.

It works out to about 14 to 52 kilograms annually, worth up to approximately $10.4 million. (Toor Jan said his boss employs two other teams of dealers who sell similar amounts of heroin to translators at the NATO bases.) In comparison, Canadian police seize only about 70 kilos of heroin in an average year in all of Canada.

Toor Jan said he had heard that some foreign contractors also buy heroin and are involved in smuggling it through Kandahar’s airport but that they “normally deal with other people, not with small guys like us”.

A Kandahar district official who has extensive knowledge of the heroin trade also said some foreign contractors and NATO military personnel are involved in trafficking heroin by plane to North America out of Afghan airports that are under NATO control.

“They have Afghan people who go through the process and purchase the drugs for them. Once it is acquired, they bring it to them, and they smuggle it to North America,” the official said in an interview in a Kandahar guesthouse. “They use the airports.”

(It is Georgia Straight policy to include anonymous sources in stories only in exceptional circumstances, such as when sources’ safety or employment could be jeopardized if their names were revealed. Wherever possible, their identities are confirmed with editors, and—to the extent possible—the Straight corroborates their information with named sources.)

The accounts give a rare glimpse into how some NATO personnel and contractors seem to have gotten ensnared in Afghanistan’s multibillion-dollar narco economy, which supplies 90 percent of the world’s opium, the raw ingredient of heroin.

Canada and other NATO powers have long been accused of turning a blind eye to a 15-fold increase in Afghan opium production since 2001 (according to UN figures) and cozying up to Afghan warlords and officials reputed to be involved with drugs.

But these new accounts suggest NATO’s presence helps fuel the gigantic Afghan drug trade.

The accounts are reminiscent of the Vietnam War, when U.S. forces befriended opium-dealing warlords in Southeast Asia and many U.S. soldiers became addicted to heroin, with some smuggling it back home.

A Canadian military historian said the notion that NATO soldiers are buying heroin in Afghanistan and smuggling it out is “completely plausible”.

“It doesn’t surprise me at all. That’s the way things are there,” Sean Maloney, associate professor of history at the Royal Military College, said by phone from Kingston, Ontario.

“In an environment like that, anything is possible.”

With between 200 and 700 daily flights, the Kandahar Airfield is the world’s busiest single-runway airport. The airfield/NATO base is the size of a small city, home to 30,000 NATO troops and contractors and, until recently, headquarters of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan.

The last Canadian troops left KAF on December 12 as the military assumes its new role training the Afghan army, mostly in Kabul, near the country’s border with Pakistan.

It’s easy to see how drugs could flood into KAF. A reporter from the Straight experienced only a cursory security check at KAF’s outer gate in a visit last spring. Inside is a large area housing thousands of Afghan and foreign contractors.

A second, more heavily guarded, gate controls entry to the NATO compound, but NATO troops and contractors can easily mingle between the two gates.

An Afghan source who works at KAF said Afghan contractors are widely known to bring in heroin for their own use and for use by NATO troops.

“It is dangerous and stressful work. They are in constant fear. So they use heroin to feel invincible and calm,” he said in an interview in Kandahar City.

He said some Afghan shopkeepers with stalls at the weekly base bazaar also bring in heroin.

“You’re dealing with a frontier town,” Maloney said of KAF. “I call it Deadwood.”

Maloney is an adviser to Canadian Forces chief of the land staff Lt.-Gen. Peter Devlin and has travelled to Afghanistan 10 times. The army has commissioned Maloney to write the history of its involvement in Afghanistan.

Maloney stressed that he was speaking as an RMC professor, not for the Canadian military.

He said KAF seems to have become an important new smuggling waypoint in recent years. The new route emerged as Afghan heroin barons sought to seize more profits by circumventing Pakistani middlemen who traditionally processed opium into heroin and smuggled it abroad through the Pakistani port of Karachi.

“They realized that with an airport [in Kandahar], they can cut the Pakistanis out,” he said.

Toor Jan said his Afghan translator clients smuggle heroin into KAF in their shoes. He said he charges them US$20 to $25 for a package of three or four grams of heroin (locals pay the equivalent of only about $6), which they resell to NATO soldiers for $40 to $50. (Each package would have a street value of $600 to $800 in Vancouver.)

“Since the foreigners are not allowed to drink liquor, they use heroin and other drugs,” he said.

Allegations of NATO troops smuggling Afghan heroin have surfaced before. Last year, the Sunday Times in London reported that British authorities were investigating whether British soldiers in Helmand province and Canadian soldiers at KAF were smuggling heroin.

An Afghan drug dealer told the Times: “Most of our other customers, apart from drug lords in foreign countries, are the military.…So most of the foreigners who do these deals are the military.

“As I have heard, they are carrying these drugs in the military airlines.”

Canadian defence officials said at the time that they had no evidence of smuggling by Canadian troops.

A retired Canadian military police captain told the Straight in a phone interview that it is common knowledge that opium is available at KAF.

“Oh, yeah, that’s open source. It’s endemic across the country,” said Wayne Boone, now vice president of the Canadian Intelligence and Military Police Association and assistant professor of international affairs at Ottawa’s Carleton University, in a phone interview. “You’ve got Afghan nationals coming in and out [of KAF] with impunity and background checks focusing only on their loyalty. It does stand to reason that opium products may be brought in.”

Boone also said Canadian soldiers flying home from Afghanistan aren’t normally subject to thorough searches. “It’s not typical to search every bag unless there’s cause.”

The Afghan opium business also seems to have gotten an unexpected boost from Canada’s much-lauded $50-million project to rebuild Kandahar’s irrigation network.

Maloney said the signature project has helped opium producers irrigate their poppies. He said he warned Canadian officials about the risk at a meeting in Kandahar in 2005. He was told not to worry because Afghan farmers were to be weaned off opium with alternative-crop programs. But those programs didn’t work, he said.

Two former Canadian soldiers said opium use among Afghan police, soldiers, and translators was widespread and sometimes posed operational problems.

“We couldn’t take Afghans out [on patrol] because they were all rolling around in a ditch, too high to cock their weapons,” said Matthew Young, who served in Afghanistan in 2006.

“We tended not to rely on Afghans for our own security,” he said by phone from Edmonton, where he lives.

Grant Custer, a Canadian artillery captain who served in Afghanistan in 2008 and 2009, said some Canadian military units in Kandahar also experienced problems with Afghan translators who used opium. “We were told to watch out for that, especially if we took them with us. They just couldn’t do their job properly,” he said by phone from Hamilton, Ontario.

A Canadian military spokesman said he has no evidence that Canadian soldiers or Afghan translators smuggled heroin out of Kandahar.

“If something was wrong with Canadian employees, action would have been taken,” Lt.-Col. Chris Lemay said by phone from Ottawa.

Lemay also said NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), not Canada, was responsible for security at KAF. Asked about drug use by Afghan soldiers, he said: “Any allegations that they would have been under the influence and difficult to work with—sure, this is Afghanistan.”

He also acknowledged that opium producers could have benefited from the Canadian irrigation project but said that it was still worthwhile because it helped Afghan farmers.

An ISAF official in Kandahar emailed the Straight a statement saying ISAF “supports a drug-free work environment and the vast majority of ISAF personnel live up to these standards”.

The Afghan source working at KAF said base security hasn’t changed in the eight months since the Straight first asked Canadian and NATO officials about the smuggling.

This story was done in collaboration with the Canadian Centre for Investigative Reporting and was supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundations. The CCIR’s Bilbo Poynter contributed additional reporting.

NATO’s Secret Afghanistan Kill List Leaked: Sanctioned Collateral Damage to Target Low-Level Taliban & Drug Dealers

In Afghanistan, Archive, Drones, GCHQ, ISAF, JPEL, NATO, NSA, NSA Files, Terrorism, WikiLeaks on December 30, 2014 at 11:43 PM



SPIEGEL h/t Laura Poitras/Jacob Appelbaum:

Death is circling above Helmand Province on the morning of Feb. 7, 2011, in the form of a British Apache combat helicopter named “Ugly 50.” Its crew is searching for an Afghan named Mullah Niaz Mohammed. The pilot has orders to kill him.

The Afghan, who has been given the code name “Doody,” is a “mid-level commander” in the Taliban, according to a secret NATO list. The document lists enemy combatants the alliance has approved for targeted killings. “Doody” is number 3,673 on the list and NATO has assigned him a priority level of three on a scale of one to four. In other words, he isn’t particularly important within the Taliban leadership structure.

The operations center identified “Doody” at 10:17 a.m. But visibility is poor and the helicopter is forced to circle another time. Then the gunner fires a “Hellfire” missile. But he has lost sight of the mullah during the maneuver, and the missile strikes a man and his child instead. The boy is killed instantly and the father is severely wounded. When the pilot realizes that the wrong man has been targeted, he fires 100 rounds at “Doody” with his 30-mm gun, critically injuring the mullah.

The child and his father are two of the many victims of the dirty secret operations that NATO conducted for years in Afghanistan. Their fate is described in secret documents to which SPIEGEL was given access. Some of the documents concerning the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the NSA and GCHQ intelligence services are from the archive of whistleblower Edward Snowden. Included is the first known complete list of the Western alliance’s “targeted killings” in Afghanistan. The documents show that the deadly missions were not just viewed as a last resort to prevent attacks, but were in fact part of everyday life in the guerilla war in Afghanistan.

The existence of documents relating to the so-called Joint Prioritized Effects List (JPEL) has only been described in vague terms until now. The missions by US special units are mentioned but not discussed in detail in the US Army Afghanistan war logs published by WikiLeaks in 2010. The documents that have now become accessible provide, for the first time, a systematic view of the targeted killings. They outline the criteria used to determine who was placed on the list and why.

The list, which included up to 750 people at times, proves for the first time that NATO didn’t just target the Taliban leadership, but also eliminated mid- and lower-level members of the group on a large scale. Some Afghans were only on the list because, as drug dealers, they were allegedly supporting the insurgents.


Adding a Name

Adding a name to the list was preceded by a month’s-long process, in which evidence was gathered, including bugged phone conversations, reports by informants and photos. In the end, the respective ISAF regional commander decided whether a suspect should be added to the list.

When an operation could potentially result in civilian casualties, ISAF headquarters in Kabul had to be involved. “The rule of thumb was that when there was estimated collateral damage of up to 10 civilians, the ISAF commander in Kabul was to decide whether the risk was justifiable,” says an ISAF officer who worked with the lists for years. If more potential civilian casualties were anticipated, the decision was left up to the relevant NATO headquarters office. Bodyguards, drivers and male attendants were viewed as enemy combatants, whether or not they actually were. Only women, children and the elderly were treated as civilians.

If a Taliban fighter was repeatedly involved in deadly attacks, a “weighing of interests” was performed. The military officials would then calculate how many human lives could be saved by the “kill,” and how many civilians would potentially be killed in an airstrike.

The case of an Afghan soldier named Hussein, number 3,341 on the list, shows how coldly NATO sometimes treated the lives of suspects. According to the documents, Hussein was suspected of involvement in an attack on ISAF forces in Helmand. A corporal in the Afghan army, he had allegedly deserted and was now on the run, presumably to join the Taliban.

NATO officials placed him on the list in the summer of 2010, as one of 669 individuals at the time. He was given the code name “Rumble” and assigned to priority level 2.

The NATO soldiers discussed the pros and cons of his killing. “The removal of Hussein will eradicate a rogue ANA SNCO from the ranks and prevent his recruitment into the (insurgency),” the assessment reads. “It will also send a clear message to any other potential ‘sleepers’.” The killing of Hussein was intended primarily as a symbol of deterrence.

But, the internal assessment continues, a disadvantage of killing the deserter was that any information Hussein might have would be lost.

Some of the JPEL candidates were only listed as being under observation or to be taken into custody. According to the current documents, in 2010 NATO even added Atta Mohammed Noor, a governor in northern Afghanistan, to the list. Noor, an ethnic Tajik and former warlord, had become wealthy through smuggling in the turmoil of war, and he was seen as someone who ruthlessly eliminated his enemies. He was listed as number 1,722 on the NATO list and given a priority level of three, but NATO merely collected information about Noor, rather than placing him on the kill list.

Death by Metadata

The documents suggest that sometimes locating a mobile phone was all it took to set the military machinery in motion. The search for the Taliban phone signals was “central to the success of operations,” states a secret British report from October 2010.

As one document states, Predator drones and Eurofighter jets equipped with sensors were constantly searching for the radio signals from known telephone numbers tied to the Taliban. The hunt began as soon as the mobile phones were switched on.

Britain’s GCHQ and the US National Security Agency (NSA) maintained long lists of Afghan and Pakistani mobile phone numbers belonging to Taliban officials. A sophisticated mechanism was activated whenever a number was detected. If there was already a recording of the enemy combatant’s voice in the archives, it was used for identification purposes. If the pattern matched, preparations for an operation could begin. The attacks were so devastating for the Taliban that they instructed their fighters to stop using mobile phones.

The document also reveals how vague the basis for deadly operations apparently was. In the voice recognition procedure, it was sufficient if a suspect identified himself by name once during the monitored conversation. Within the next 24 hours, this voice recognition was treated as “positive target identification” and, therefore, as legitimate grounds for an airstrike. This greatly increased the risk of civilian casualties.

See Also: Death By Unreliable Metadata: NSA Creates SIM Card Kill List for CIA/JSOC Drone Strikes


Targeting the Drug Trade

Probably one of the most controversial decisions by NATO in Afghanistan is the expansion of these operations to include drug dealers. According to an NSA document, the United Nations estimated that the Taliban was earning $300 million a year through the drug trade. The insurgents, the document continues, “could not be defeated without disrupting the drug trade.”

According to the NSA document, in October 2008 the NATO defense ministers made the momentous decision that drug networks would now be “legitimate targets” for ISAF troops. “Narcotics traffickers were added to the Joint Prioritized Effects List (JPEL) list for the first time,” the report reads.

In the opinion of American commanders like Bantz John Craddock, there was no need to prove that drug money was being funneled to the Taliban to declare farmers, couriers and dealers as legitimate targets of NATO strikes.

In early 2009, Craddock, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Europe at the time, issued an order to expand the targeted killings of Taliban officials to drug producers. This led to heated discussions within NATO. German NATO General Egon Ramms declared the order “illegal” and a violation of international law. The power struggle within NATO finally led to a modification of Craddock’s directive: Targets related to the drug production at least had to be investigated as individual cases.



In Afghanistan, Germany is a member of the “14 Eyes” intelligence-sharing group. In addition to the Anglo-Saxon countries, the group includes Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Sweden and Norway.

These countries operate their own technical platform in Afghanistan code-named “Center Ice,” which is used to monitor and exchange data. According to a 2009 NSA presentation, Center Ice was not just used to share intelligence about mobile phone conversations, but also information about targets.


A 2009 CIA study that addresses targeted killings of senior enemy officials worldwide reaches a bitter conclusion. Because of the Taliban’s centralized but flexible leadership, as well as its egalitarian tribal structures, the targeted killings were only moderately successful in Afghanistan. “Morover, the Taliban has a high overall ability to replace lost leaders,” the study finds.


The material is from 2009 to 2011, and falls within the term of US President Barack Obama.

After Obama assumed office, the US government opted for a new strategy. In June 2009, then Defense Secretary Robert Gates installed Stanley McChrystal, a four-star general who had served in Iraq, as commander of US forces in Afghanistan. McChrystal promoted the aggressive pursuit of the Taliban.

This marked the beginning of one of the bloodiest phases of the war. Some 2,412 civilians died in Afghanistan in 2009. Two-thirds of them were killed by insurgents and 25 percent by NATO troops and Afghan security forces. The number of operations against the Taliban rose sharply, to between 10 and 15 a night. The operations were based on the lists maintained by the CIA and NATO — Obama’s lists. The White House dubbed the strategy “escalate and exit.”

McChrystal’s successor, General David Petraeus, documented the strategy in “Field Manual 3-24” (PDF) on fighting insurgencies, which remains a standard work today (PDF). Petraeus outlined three stages in fighting guerilla organizations like the Taliban. The first was a cleansing phase, in which the enemy leadership is weakened. After that, local forces were to regain control of the captured areas. The third phase was focused on reconstruction. Behind closed doors, Petraeus and his staff explained exactly what was meant by “cleansing.” German politicians recall something that Michael T. Flynn, the head of ISAF intelligence in Afghanistan, once said during a briefing: “The only good Talib is a dead Talib.”

Under Petraeus, a merciless campaign began to hunt down the so-called shadow governors and local supporters aligned with the Islamists. For the Americans, the fact that the operations often ended in killings was seen as a success. In August 2010, Petraeus proudly told diplomats in Kabul that he had noticed a shifting trend. The figures he presented as evidence made some of the ambassadors feel uneasy. At least 365 insurgent commanders, Petraeus explained, had been neutralized in the last three months, for an average of about four killings a day.


The 13-year combat mission in Afghanistan comes to an official end this week, but the kill lists raise legal and moral questions that extend far beyond Afghanistan. Can a democracy be allowed to kill its enemies in a targeted manner when the objective is not to prevent an imminent attack? And does the goal of eliminating as many Taliban as possible justify killing innocent bystanders?

A democracy that kills its enemies on the basis of nothing but suspicion squanders its claim to moral superiority, making itself complicit instead. This lesson from Afghanistan also applies to the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and Yemen.


LeakSource has cross-referenced the redacted JPEL kill list with WikiLeaks’ Afghanistan war logs, and has been able to match-up target numbers and reveal some of the names:


#25 – IS2012
“Local Leader Mullah Nadir s/o Mirza Rahim from Almalek Village”
Related: Taliban Routs Afghan Military Convoy in Ambush (October 2014)


#26 – IS2058
“Taliban Shadow Governor of Faryab Mullah Abdullah”
Related: 57 Insurgents Eliminated in Faryab Offensive (April 2014)


#31 – IS2094
Maulawi Shamsuddin
Taliban chief strategist in Kunduz. Wanted for several attacks, including some targeted at ISAF forces
Related: Prominent Taliban Leader Killed in Badakhshan Province (April 2012) *Unsure if it is the same Shamsuddin


#41 – IS3145
Shirin Agha
Wanted for attacks against German and Aghan security forces
Related: Rebel Leader Among 7 Killed in Kunduz (March 2014)


#151 – IS0210
Related: Janan Leader of Taliban Killed (March 2013)


#152 – IS3288
Abdul Hadi


#245 – IS1538


#273 – IS2004
“Kajaki Taliban Commander Abdul (Salam)”
Related: Brother of Taliban’s Military Commission Reported Killed (June 2012)


#281 – IS2093


#304 – IS2242
Abdul Rahman
Wanted for hijacking two tanker trucks near Kunduz
Related: KSK Arrests Taliban Mastermind Mullah Abdul Rahman (October 2012)


#306 – IS2252
“Helmand Provincial Council member Haji Naim”


#363- IS3227


#527 – IS1286 (previously IS1185)
Noor Qasim
“SVBIED (Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device) facilitator and insurgent leader in Khowst Province. Facilitated the 22AUG07 suicide bomb attack on Governor (Jamal), Khost province.  Has ties to Al-Qaida and frequently travels between AF and PK to coordinate insurgent activities. Assembled over 100 fighters to conduct successful attacks against the ANP.”
Related: Afghan Taliban Confirms Death of Shadow Governors for Kunar, Kandahar (April 2014) *Unsure if it is the same Noor Qasim


#585 – RTAF1172
Gul Mohammad
“HIG Sub-commander responsible for coordinating insurgent activities within the Bak District.  His removal would result in a gap in HIG leadership in the Bak district.”
Related: Prominent Taliban Leaders Arrested in Nuristan Province (September 2012) *Unsure if it is the same Gul Mohammad

The Kill Team (2014)

In Afghanistan, Archive, Military, USA on November 2, 2014 at 4:02 AM



THE KILL TEAM goes behind closed doors to tell the riveting story of Specialist Adam Winfield, a 21-year-old infantryman in Afghanistan who attempted with the help of his father to alert the military to heinous war crimes his platoon was committing. Tragically, his father’s pleas for help went unheeded. Once Adam’s fellow soldiers got wind of what he’d done, they threatened to silence him — permanently. Forced to choose between his conscience and his own survival, Adam found himself drawn into a moral abyss, faced with a split-second decision that would change his life forever.

With extraordinary access to the key individuals involved in the case – including Adam, his passionately supportive parents, and his startlingly candid compatriots — THE KILL TEAM is an intimate look at the personal stories so often lost inside the larger coverage of the longest war in US history.



Related Links:

Rolling Stone Releases U.S. Army “Kill Team” Photos & Videos From Afghanistan

Spiegel TV: “Kill Team” Documentary (2011)

“taken off bus and killed” – Afghan dual Citizen Murdered

In Afghanistan, Al Jazeera NEWSHOUR, Al-Qaeda, Amnesty, Australia, Australia, Internet, leaksource, Middle East, News, Terrorism, World Revolution on September 28, 2014 at 5:27 PM

An Afghan Australian who was tortured and killed in Afghanistan while visiting relatives was targeted because he was Australian, authorities say.

Sayed Habib Musawi, 56, grew up in Helmand Province, in Afghanistan’s south, and came to Australia by boat in 2000.

He held an Australian passport and citizenship and lived in Sydney’s west with his family, who were brought to Australia in 2005.

Mr Musawi was killed travelling to Kabul from Ghazni province last week during a trip to Afghanistan to visit his family.

His body was found on the side of the road.

Ghazi’s deputy governor, Mohammad Ali Ahmadi, said Mr Musawi was killed in a “non-human” manner.

“His hands were tied from the back and there were signs of beating,” Mr Ahmadi told AM.

“The bullet wounds were clearly visible on his dead body. The murderers beat and tortured him. People in the area contacted us, so we ordered the district security chief to investigate.

“After an investigation it became clear that the dead body belongs to Sayed Habib, an Afghan Australian who came to visit his family.”

Mr Ahmadi said Mr Musawi was killed by the Taliban because he was an Australian citizen.

“Of course the reason is that he was an Afghan-Australian,” he said.

“He didn’t do anything besides that – he didn’t do anything wrong, he wasn’t a criminal, he wasn’t involved in government activities.

“The reason of his murder was very clear – that he was a dual citizen, he came from a country that Taliban think is an infidel country.

“When the Taliban arrested him, he said to them, ‘I came from Australia to see my family.’ And then the Taliban… issued an order for his murder”

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