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Top Secret Documents Reveal How GCHQ Hacked Belgacom

In Archive, Belgacom, Belgium, Five Eyes, GCHQ, Hacking, NSA, NSA Files, Surveillance on December 15, 2014 at 9:50 PM

map-belgacom-connections

12/13/2014

Ryan Gallagher/TheIntercept:

Last year, documents from National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden confirmed that British surveillance agency Government Communications Headquarters was behind the attack, codenamed Operation Socialist. And in November, The Intercept revealed that the malware found on Belgacom’s systems was one of the most advanced spy tools ever identified by security researchers, who named it “Regin.”

The full story about GCHQ’s infiltration of Belgacom, however, has never been told. Key details about the attack have remained shrouded in mystery—and the scope of the attack unclear.

Now, in partnership with Dutch and Belgian newspapers NRC Handelsblad and De Standaard, The Intercept has pieced together the first full reconstruction of events that took place before, during, and after the secret GCHQ hacking operation.

The origins of the attack on Belgacom can be traced back to 2009, when GCHQ began developing new techniques to hack into telecommunications networks. The methods were discussed and developed during a series of top-secret “signals development” conferences, held annually by countries in the so-called “Five Eyes” surveillance alliance: the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.

Between 2009 and 2011, GCHQ worked with its allies to develop sophisticated new tools and technologies it could use to scan global networks for weaknesses and then penetrate them. According to top-secret GCHQ documents, the agency wanted to adopt the aggressive new methods in part to counter the use of privacy-protecting encryption—what it described as the “encryption problem.”

When communications are sent across networks in encrypted format, it makes it much harder for the spies to intercept and make sense of emails, phone calls, text messages, internet chats, and browsing sessions. For GCHQ, there was a simple solution. The agency decided that, where possible, it would find ways to hack into communication networks to grab traffic before it’s encrypted.

The British spies identified Belgacom as a top target to be infiltrated. The company, along with its subsidiary Belgacom International Carrier Services, plays an important role in Europe, and has partnerships with hundreds of telecommunications companies across the world—in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. The Belgacom subsidiary maintains one of the world’s largest “roaming” hubs, which means that when foreign visitors traveling through Europe on vacation or a business trip use their cellphones, many of them connect to Belgacom’s international carrier networks.

The Snowden documents show that GCHQ wanted to gain access to Belgacom so that it could spy on phones used by surveillance targets travelling in Europe. But the agency also had an ulterior motive. Once it had hacked into Belgacom’s systems, GCHQ planned to break into data links connecting Belgacom and its international partners, monitoring communications transmitted between Europe and the rest of the world. A map in the GCHQ documents, named “Belgacom_connections,” highlights the company’s reach across Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, illustrating why British spies deemed it of such high value.

belgacom-connections

Before GCHQ launched its attack on Belgacom’s systems, the spy agency conducted in-depth reconnaissance, using its powerful surveillance systems to covertly map out the company’s network and identify key employees “in areas related to maintenance and security.”

key-belgacom-staff

GCHQ documents show that it maintains special databases for this purpose, storing details about computers used by engineers and system administrators who work in the nerve center, or “network operations center,” of computer networks worldwide. Engineers and system administrators are particularly interesting to the spies because they manage networks—and hold the keys that can be used to unlock large troves of private data.

GCHQ developed a system called NOCTURNAL SURGE to search for particular engineers and system administrators by finding their IP addresses, unique identifiers that are allocated to computers when they connect to the internet. In early 2011, the documents show, GCHQ refined the NOCTURNAL SURGE system with the help of its Canadian counterparts, who had developed a similar tool, named PENTAHO.

nocturnal-surge

GCHQ narrowed down IP addresses it believed were linked to the Belgacom engineers by using data its surveillance systems had collected about internet activity, before moving into what would be the final stages prior to launching its attack. The documents show that the agency used a tool named HACIENDA to scan for vulnerable potential access points in the Belgacom’s networks; it then went hunting for particular engineers or administrators that it could infect with malware.

The British spies, part of special unit named the Network Analysis Center, began trawling through their vast repositories of intercepted Internet data for more details about the individuals they had identified as suspected Belgacom engineers.

The spies used the IP addresses they had associated with the engineers as search terms to sift through their surveillance troves, and were quickly able to find what they needed to confirm the employees’ identities and target them individually with malware.

The confirmation came in the form of Google, Yahoo, and LinkedIn “cookies,” tiny unique files that are automatically placed on computers to identify and sometimes track people browsing the Internet, often for advertising purposes. GCHQ maintains a huge repository named MUTANT BROTH that stores billions of these intercepted cookies, which it uses to correlate with IP addresses to determine the identity of a person. GCHQ refers to cookies internally as “target detection identifiers.”

cookies-qi

Top-secret GCHQ documents name three male Belgacom engineers who were identified as targets to attack. The Intercept has confirmed the identities of the men, and contacted each of them prior to the publication of this story; all three declined comment and requested that their identities not be disclosed.

GCHQ monitored the browsing habits of the engineers, and geared up to enter the most important and sensitive phase of the secret operation. The agency planned to perform a so-called “Quantum Insert” attack, which involves redirecting people targeted for surveillance to a malicious website that infects their computers with malware at a lightning pace. In this case, the documents indicate that GCHQ set up a malicious page that looked like LinkedIn to trick the Belgacom engineers. (The NSA also uses Quantum Inserts to target people, as The Intercept has previously reported.)

A GCHQ document reviewing operations conducted between January and March 2011 noted that the hack on Belgacom was successful, and stated that the agency had obtained access to the company’s systems as planned. By installing the malware on the engineers’ computers, the spies had gained control of their machines, and were able to exploit the broad access the engineers had into the networks for surveillance purposes.

The document stated that the hacking attack against Belgacom had penetrated “both deep into the network and at the edge of the network,” adding that ongoing work would help “further this new access.”

By December 2011, as part of a second “surge” against Belgacom, GCHQ identified other cellphone operators connecting to company’s network as part of international roaming partnerships, and successfully hacked into data links carrying information over a protocol known as GPRS, which handles cellphone internet browsing sessions and multimedia messages.

The spy agency was able to obtain data that was being sent between Belgacom and other operators through encrypted tunnels known as “virtual private networks.” GCHQ boasted that its work to conduct “exploitation” against these private networks had been highly productive, noting “the huge extent of opportunity that this work has identified.” Another document, dated from late 2011, added: “Network Analysis on BELGACOM hugely successful enabling exploitation.”

GCHQ had accomplished its objective. The agency had severely compromised Belgacom’s systems and could intercept encrypted and unencrypted private data passing through its networks. The hack would remain undetected for two years, until the spring of 2013.

via EdwardSnowden.com:

We’ve never established smoking-gun attribution for a governmental cyber attack against critical infrastructure before, and for the first documented example to show on EU member state mounting a cyber attack on another is a breathtaking example of the scale of the state-sponsored hacking problem.

If we say it’s OK for the UK to hack Belgium, we’re implicitly accepting the inverse. And if the UK can hit Belgium, China can hit the UK. When we find these massive holes in the security of our critical infrastructure, we ned to close them rather than tear them open, or else we’ll soon find everything is vulnerable and nothing is safe.

The people with the most to lose in that kind of world are the ones with the most complex systems. In other words, us, not them. – Edward Snowden

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