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CSPAN Caller Asks NYTimes’ David Sanger Why Paper is Ignoring Evidence of Building 7 Demolition on 9/11

In 9/11, Archive, Conspiracy on December 28, 2013 at 11:20 AM

h/t 4thAnon

12/22/2013

During a CSPAN interview, New York Times’ Chief Washington Correspondent David Sanger was asked by a caller why the New York Times has refused to cover the obvious controlled demolition of World Trade Center Building 7. Sanger’s response was evasive, obfuscatory, and mendacious.

The CSPAN caller asked Sanger:

“Across the street from the New York Times building there’s a billboard asking where your paper’s coverage is of the over 2,000 architects and engineers who are demanding a new investigation of Building 7’s destruction on 9/11, and the overwhelming evidence that pre-planted explosives destroyed it. Since this has everything to do with our national security, can you explain what rational and scientific basis your paper has for failing to fairly and objectively cover this crucial issue?”

Sanger responded with this circuitous answer:

“Trust me, the people who work at the New York Times have as much of a critical interest in what happened on 9/11 as anybody else. Because not only are they reporters there, but they live and work within the city. And we’ve devoted a fairly considerable amount of repertorial time over the past number of years to the question of all the different theories – conspiracy theories, regular theories, non-conspiracy theories – about what happened on that day. And you’ve heard the huge variety of them. We have not yet found any convincing evidence to suggest that there was a plot …that there was a plot that the President knew about in advance, which was one of the issues that came up. I was with the President on 9/11 at the school in Florida. I can tell you that he looked pretty shocked by what had happened, and shell-shocked by what had happened. And we have not found any evidence so far. That doesn’t mean that there’s none there. But we have not found any evidence so far to suggest that the building collapses were caused by anything other than the two airplanes that flew into them.”

Sanger blatantly evaded the caller’s question about Building 7, blaming the explosive destruction of the Twin Towers (designed to withstand impact of a Boeing 707, possibly multiple), and the smooth free-fall drop of Building 7, on “the two airplanes that flew into them.”

No airplane flew into Building 7, and no smoother and more symmetrical near-free-fall implosion of a tall building has ever been recorded.

Despite ReThink911’s billboard directly across the street from the NYTimes Building, and despite receiving numerous letters, op-ed submissions, informational materials, and phone calls, the NY Times continues to ignore the evidence of Building 7’s controlled demolition.

Al-Qaeda Expenses

In Al-Qaeda, Archive, Mali on December 28, 2013 at 8:30 AM

12/24/2013

AP:

Al-Qaeda is obsessed with documenting the most minute expenses.

In more than 100 receipts left in a building occupied by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Timbuktu earlier this year, the militants assiduously tracked their cash flow, recording purchases as small as a single light bulb. The often tiny amounts are carefully written out in pencil and colored pen on scraps of paper and Post-it notes: The equivalent of $1.80 for a bar of soap; $8 for a packet of macaroni; $14 for a tube of super glue.

The accounting system on display in the documents found by The Associated Press is a mirror image of what researchers have discovered in other parts of the world where Al-Qaeda operates, including Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq. The terror group’s documents around the world also include corporate workshop schedules, salary spreadsheets, philanthropy budgets, job applications, public relations advice and letters from the equivalent of a human resources division.

The picture that emerges from what is one of the largest stashes of Al-Qaeda documents to be made public shows a rigid bureaucracy, replete with a chief executive, a board of directors and departments such as human resources and public relations. Experts say each branch of Al-Qaeda replicates the same corporate structure.

Among the most revealing documents are the receipts, which offer a granular view of how Al-Qaeda’s fighters lived every day as well as its larger priorities.

An inordinate number of receipts are for groceries, suggesting a diet of macaroni with meat and tomato sauce, as well as large quantities of powdered milk. There are 27 invoices for meat, 13 for tomatoes, 11 for milk, 11 for pasta, seven for onions, and many others for tea, sugar, and honey.

They record the $0.60 cake one of their fighters ate, and the $1.80 bar of soap another used to wash his hands. They list a broom for $3 and bleach for $3.30. These relatively petty amounts are logged with the same care as the $5,400 advance they gave to one commander, or the $330 they spent to buy 3,300 rounds of ammunition.

In Afghanistan, detailed accounting records found in an abandoned Al-Qaeda camp in 2001 included salary lists, stringent documentation on each fighter, job application forms asking for level of education and language skills, as well as notebook after notebook of expenses. In Iraq, US forces recovered entire Excel spreadsheets, detailing salaries for Al-Qaeda fighters.

This detailed accounting system allows Al-Qaeda to keep track of the significant sums of money involved in feeding, training and recruiting thousands of fighters. It’s also an attempt to keep track of the fighters themselves, who often operate remotely.

The majority of the invoices found on a cement floor in a building in Timbuktu are scribbled by hand, on post-it notes, on lined math paper or on the backs of envelopes, as if operatives in the field were using whatever writing surface they could find. Others are typed, sometimes repeating the same items, in what may serve as formal expense reports for their higher-ups. Al-Qaeda clearly required such expense reports — in a letter from the stash, middle managers chide a terrorist for not handing his in on time.

The corporate nature of the organization is also on display in the types of activities they funded.

For example, two receipts, for $4,000 and $6,800, are listed as funds for “workshops,” another concept borrowed from business. A flier found in another building occupied by their fighters confirm that Al-Qaeda held the equivalent of corporate training retreats. It lists detailed schedules: Early morning exercise from 5 to 6:30 a.m.; lessons on how to use a GPS from 10 to 10:30 a.m.; arms training from 10:30 a.m. to noon; and various afternoon classes on preaching to other Muslims, nationalism and democracy.

A relatively small ratio of the receipts are expense reports for fighters and weapons. One unit presented a politely worded request for funds, entitled: “The list of names of militants who are asking for clothes and boots to protect themselves from the cold.”

Far more deal with the mundane aspects of running a state, such as keeping the lights on. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb invaded Timbuktu in April 2012, and took over its state-run utilities, paying to have fuel trucked in from neighboring Algeria. One invoice shows they paid $3,720 for 20 barrels of diesel for the city’s power station.

There’s also an advance for the prison and a detailed budget for the Islamic Tribunal, where judges were paid $2 per day to hear cases.

Along with the nuts and bolts of governing, it’s clear that the fighters were actively trying to woo the population. They set aside money for charity: $4 for medicine “for a Shiite with a sick child,” and $100 in financial aid for a man’s wedding. And they reimbursed residents for damages, such as $50 for structural repairs, with a note that the house in question “was hit by fighter’s cars.”

And it’s obvious that the fighters spent a good part of their time proselytizing, with expense reports for trips to distant villages to impart their ultra-strict vision of Islam. One receipt bluntly lists $200 for a “trip for spreading propaganda.”

While not overtly explained, the sizable receipts for car repairs suggest regular missions into the desert. The many receipts for oil changes, car batteries, filters and parts indicate the tough terrain battered the fighters’ Toyota Land Cruisers.

Finally, the names on the receipts reveal the majority of fighters on the group’s payroll were foreign-born. There’s a $1,000 advance to a man identified as “Talhat the Libyan.” Another is issued to “Tarek the Algerian.”

The names furthermore confirm that the top leaders of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb were based in Timbuktu. Among them is Abou Zeid, probably the most feared of Al-Qaeda’s local commanders who orchestrated the kidnappings of dozens of Westerners until his death this spring.

“In the name of Allah, the most merciful,” begins a request for funds dated Dec. 29, 2012, and addressed to Abou Zeid. “We are writing to inform you that we need rockets for our camp — a total of 4 is needed. May God protect you.”

Professor Edward Frenkel: The Mathematics Behind NSA’s Encryption Backdoors

In Archive, Encryption, NSA, NSA Files, Surveillance, Technology on December 28, 2013 at 3:18 AM

via Numberphile h/t YourAnonNews

Professor Edward Frenkel explains the mathematics behind NSA’s weakening of encryption standards.

See: NSA Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web & Security Industry Pioneer RSA Paid $10 Million to Use Backdoored NSA Algorithm in Crypto Software

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