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Britain Prepared for War in Syria 2 Years Before Crisis Flared Up, France’s Former FM Roland Dumas Says

In LEAKSOURCE ORIGINAL NEWS on June 14, 2013 at 10:29 PM

 

06/13/2013

Former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas said that Britain had been preparing gunmen to invade Syria two years before the crisis there flared up in 2011.

During a TV show, Dumas said ”I was in Britain two years ago, and I met British officials, some my friends…they admitted that they were up to something in Syria.”

”They even asked me to join them in my capacity as a foreign minister, but I declined,” he added.

He indicated that the plan of striking Syria had been prepared in advance long before the 2011 events, adding that the goal was to overthrow the Syrian government that considers Israel an enemy.

The TV show was dedicated to discussing the war in Syria.

 

Related Link: Retired 4-Star General Wesley Clark: “7 Countries in 5 Years”

UNCLASSIFIED Report on the “President’s Surveillance Program” (2009)

In Archive, Bush, NSA, Surveillance, USA on June 14, 2013 at 7:35 PM

EFF:

The NSA’s domestic spying program, known in official government documents as the “President’s Surveillance Program,” (“The Program”) was implemented by President George W. Bush shortly after the attacks on September 11, 2001. The US Government still considers the Program officially classified, but a tremendous amount of information has been exposed by various whistleblowers, admitted to by government officials during Congressional hearings and with public statements, and reported on in investigations by major newspaper across the country.

Our NSA Domestic Spying Timeline has a full list of important dates, events, and reports, but we also want to explain—to the extent we understand it—the full scope of the Program and how the government has implemented it.

In the weeks after 9/11, President Bush authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct a range of surveillance activities inside the United States, which had been barred by law and agency policy for decades. When the NSA’s spying program was first exposed by the New York Times in 2005, President Bush admitted to a small aspect of the program—what the administration labeled the “Terrorist Surveillance Program”—in which the NSA monitored, without warrants, the communications of between 500-1000 people inside the US with suspected connections to Al Qaeda.

But other aspects of the Program were aimed not just at targeted individuals, but perhaps millions of innocent Americans never suspected of a crime.

Details of Every American’s Call History

First, the government convinced the major telecommunications companies in the US, including AT&T, MCI, and Sprint, to hand over the “call-detail records” of their customers. According to an investigation by USA Today, this included “customers’ names, street addresses, and other personal information.” In addition, the government received “detailed records of calls they made—across town or across the country—to family members, co-workers, business contacts and others.”

A person familiar with the matter told USA Today that the agency’s goal was “to create a database of every call ever made” within the nation’s borders. All of this was done without a warrant or any judicial oversight.

Real Time Access to Phone and Internet Traffic

Second, the same telecommunications companies also allowed the NSA to install sophisticated communications surveillance equipment in secret rooms at key telecommunications facilities around the country. This equipment gave the NSA unfettered access to large streams of domestic and international communications in real time—what amounted to at least 1.7 billion emails a day, according to the Washington Post. The NSA could then data mine and analyze this traffic for suspicious key words, patterns and connections. Again, all of this was done without a warrant in violation of federal law and the Constitution.

The Technology That Made It Possible

But how did the government accomplish this task and how do we know? In addition to investigative reports by the New York Times and others, AT&T technician turned whistleblower Mark Klein provided EFF with eyewitness testimony and documents describing one such secret room located at AT&T’s Folsom Street facility in San Francisco, California.

It works like this: when you send an email or otherwise use the internet, the data travels from your computer, through telecommunication companies’ wires and fiber optics networks, to your intended recipient. To intercept these communications, the government installed devices known as “fiber-optic splitters” in many of the main telecommunication junction points in the United States (like the AT&T facility in San Francisco). These splitters make exact copies of the data passing through them: then, one stream is directed to the government, while the other stream is directed to the intended recipients.

The Klein documents reveal the specific equipment installed at the AT&T facility and the processing power of the equipment within the secret rooms. One type of machine installed is a Narus Semantic Traffic Analyzer, a powerful tool for deep packet inspection. Narus has continually refined their capabilities and—as of the mid-2000s—each Narus machine was capable of analyzing 10 gigabits of IP packets, and 2.5 gigabits of web traffic or email, per second. It is likely even more powerful today. The Narus machine can then reconstruct the information transmitted through the network and forward the communications to a central location for storage and analysis.

In a declaration in our lawsuit, thirty-year NSA veteran William Binney estimates that “NSA installed no few than ten and possibly in excess of twenty intercept centers within the United States.” Binney also estimates NSA has collected “between 15 and 20 trillion” transactions over the past 11 years.

In April 2012, long-time national security author James Bamford reported NSA is spending $2 billion to construct a data center in a remote part of Utah to house the information it has been collecting for the past decade. “Flowing through its servers and routers and stored in near-bottomless databases,” Bamford wrote, “will be all forms of communication, including the complete contents of private emails, cell phone calls, and Google searches, as well as all sorts of personal data trails—parking receipts, travel itineraries, bookstore purchases, and other digital ‘pocket litter.’”

The Utah data center will be fully operational in September 2013.

There is an NSA/CIA Hybrid Agency That May Explain Snowden’s Involvement in SIGINT and HUMINT

In Archive, CIA, NSA, Snowden, Surveillance on June 14, 2013 at 3:43 AM

(L) State Department Communications Annex (R) NSA/CIA Special Collection Service (SCS) – Beltsville, MD

06/13/2013

The media is quoting a number of intelligence “insiders” who are questioning NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden’s involvement in National Security Agency (NSA) signals intelligence and meta-data mining programs like PRISM and CIA human intelligence (HUMINT) operations.

However, the U.S. intelligence “insiders” may be trying their best to cover up the operations of a little-known hybrid NSA-CIA organizations known as the Special Collection Service (SCS), known internally at NSA as “F6,” and which is headquartered in Beltsville, Maryland in what appears to be a normal office building with a sign bearing the letters “CSSG” at its front driveway off of Springfield Road. Adjacent to the CSSG building is the State Department’s Beltsville Communications Annex, known internally at the State Department as SA-26 and part of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, which also handles encrypted communications to CIA stations around the world.

Beltsville, MD SCS CSSG Entrance Sign

CSSG is listed in area phone directories as Communications Systems Support Group, 11600 Springfield Road, Laurel, Maryland, 20708-3528, with a phone number of (301) 210-1776.

“1776,” in this case, is the farthest thing from the ideals of founders like Thomas Jefferson, who developed his own encryption code, still known as the “Jefferson cipher,” in order to encode messages sent between the covert revolutionary Committees of Correspondence.

The SCS uses the State Department’s secure communications satellite channels to communicate with SCS covert electronic eavesdropping facilities embedded in U.S. diplomatic embassies and missions abroad. One of the SCS units is located at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. Snowden said he was responsible for maintaining network security at the mission.

According to the list of key foreign service officers at U.S. diplomatic posts, dated 2008, mission is located at 11 Rte de Pregny, 1292 Chambesy in Geneva. While Snowden worked at the mission, the ambassador was Warren Tichenor and the deputy chief of mission was Mark Storella. Other diplomats assigned to the mission when Snowden was assigned to it included:David Gilmour, Anne Coughlin (the Regional Security Officer),Mark G. Bandik (USAID), David Reimer, Lisa Myers,Louis Nelli, Nance Kyloh, Ritchie Miller, Kathy J. Beck (Internal Revenue Service), Don Greer, Doug Wells, Ann Chick, Jeffrey D. Kovar (FBI Legal Attaché), and Michael Klecheski (Political Officer).

Evidence is mounting that Snowden was working for the SCS in Geneva. The Swiss Foreign ministry has confirmed that Snowden was declared by the U.S. State Department as an “attaché” assigned to the mission from March 2007 to February 2009. Snowden’s name would not necessarily appear on the State Department’s diplomatic list because it only specifies “key” foreign service officers and not normally Diplomatic Telecommunications Service personnel, of which Snowden was likely one. In 2009, Snowden left the CIA to work for Dell Computers and thereafter went to work for Booz Allen Hamilton as a contractor for the NSA at “NSA Hawaii,” the Regional security Operations Center located at Kunia on Oahu and which is responsible for eavesdropping on the Asia-Pacific region.

Snowden told The Guardian that he witnessed CIA agents routinely getting a Swiss banker drunk and then encouraging him to drive home. After the banker was arrested for drunk driving, the CIA offered to bail him out of trouble if he became a CIA source.

Snowden’s involvement with the SCS would have also given him access to information on CIA stations, CIA official cover agents assigned to U.S. diplomatic posts like Geneva, and surveillance priorities for NSA, such as those depicted on a Top Secret map contained in a slide on NSA’s BOUNDLESSINFORMANT global electronic surveillance program.

SCS permits NSA to conduct surveillance on targets that are normally denied due to high levels of physical security and encryption. Black bag CIA and NSA teams penetrate physical security and place listening devices in secure areas and embed Trojan horse programs in computer systems and networks that allow NSA to bypass encryption controls.

The SCS is also used to recruit foreign nationals who would be helpful in providing access to government and commercial networks and databases. Chief targets for such recruitment are database managers, systems administrators, and computer security technicians, in other words, people like Snowden. Even Swiss bankers with access to secret accounts would be targeted by the SCS to provide system passwords and remote access techniques to banking networks. The Swiss government has sent a diplomatic note to the U.S. government demanding an explanation of Snowden’s allegations about the recruitment of the Swiss banker. Swiss counter-intelligence is rated among the best in the world.

Communications Security establishment Canada (CSEC) officer Mike Frost was the first to reveal details about SCS in his 1994 book Spyworld: Inside the Canadian and American Intelligence Establishments. Frost was trained to conduct covert communications surveillance in foreign capitals at SCS, which, before moving to the Beltsville facility, was located in a strip shopping center in College Park, Maryland behind a false retail operation. CSEC’s operation was code named PILGRIM and it used an NSA system code named ORATORY to conduct surveillance from Canadian embassies in countries around the world.

NSA, like CSEC, Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Australia’s Defense Signals Directorate (DSD), and New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Board (GCSB)– known as the UK-USA or “Five Eyes” countries — conduct covert electronic surveillance from the nation’s embassies and consulates abroad. The operations are supported by SCS. Not only does the NSA and CIA maintain special collections units at the U.S. mission in Geneva but most U.S. diplomatic missions, including the ill-fated diplomatic mission in Benghazi, housed SCS surveillance units.

Snowden, in his televised interview with The Guardian, referred to NSA’s “partners,” which are the Five Eyes English-speaking nations. He also spoke of “third parties,” which are non-English speaking nations that are part of the signals intelligence “club,” countries like Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium. NSA also maintain agreements with Third Parties, which, in what could be an unfortunate for Snowden, the People’s Republic of China. Two NSA listening stations in Xinjiang in western China, located at Qitai and Korla, were code named SAUGUS and SAUCEPAN, respectively. In addition, GCHQ maintains an SCS surveillance station at its Hong Kong consulate, which is nicknamed “the Alamo.”

The NSA’s eavesdropping system ran out of the U.S. embassy in Moscow was once code named BROADSIDE. CSEC PILGRIM surveillance units, operated under Canadian embassy and high commission diplomatic cover and supported by SCS, were present in Caracas (ARTICHOKE), Beijing (BADGER), Mexico City (CORNFLOWER), New Delhi (DAISY), Kingston, Jamaica (EGRET), Rabat (IRIS), Abidjan (JASMINE), Bucharest (HOLLYHOCK), and Moscow (SPHINX). Other PILGRIM units operated in Canadian embassies in Rome; San Jose, Costa Rica; Tokyo; and Warsaw.

SCS maintained a surveillance unit at the Canadian High Commiission in New Delhi

Among the most storied SCS operations was the planting in 2001 of 27 bugging devices on the Boeing-767 delivered to China for use by Chinese President Jiang Zemin as his official plane. Chinese counter-intelligence discovered the bugs before they were activated. SCS also reportedly set up a surveillance unit a mile from Osama Bin Laden’s alleged compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. SCS units were also deployed to Chechnya during the first Russo-Chechen war to assist Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev in evading Russian signals intelligence direction finding operations targeting his personal satellite phone. In 1996, Dudayev ran out of luck after visiting President Bill Clinton helped embattled President Boris Yeltsin’s re-election chances by providing the Russian President with Dudayev’s NSA-triangulated fix. Dudayev was killed, while talking on his phone, by a Russian air-to ground missile.

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